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SIGNS OF THE TIMES: SCARLET LETTER
PROBATION CONDITIONS*
"Measures are effective which have the impact of the 'scarlet letter'
described by Nathaniel Hawthorne.. .. "**
On May 20, 1987, the Multnomah County Circuit Court in Port-
land, Oregon convicted Richard J. Bateman of two counts of sexual
abuse in the first degree.1 The trial judge suspended imposition of a
sentence and instead placed Bateman on probation for five years.2 As a
condition of probation, the judge required Bateman to post signs read-
ing "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO CHILDREN AL-
LOWED," in three-inch lettering, on the front door of his residence
and both doors of any vehicle he operates.3
* The Author wishes to express his appreciation to Ms. Diane Alessi, Deputy
Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, Salem, Oregon, for her invaluable assistance.
This Recent Development is dedicated to my wife, Karen, who gave birth to and almost
single-handedly cared for a different sort of "recent development" named Samantha and
a prior publication named Kate, while this was being written.
** Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 496
So.2d 142 (Fla. 1986). "Measures" refers to probation conditions.
1. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Bateman, 94 Or. App. 449, 765 P.2d 249 (1987)
(No. A44854) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefg. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of the Bateman case.
2. Under Oregon law, sexual abuse in the first degree is a class C felony. OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.425(2) (1985). The maximum penalty for the offense is 5 years imprison-
ment or a $100,000 fine. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.605(3) and 161.625(1) (1985). Thus,
Bateman faced a possible sentence of ten years imprisonment and a $200,000 fine.
In Oregon, courts may place convicted sex offenders on probation if the court deter-
mines the defendant is treatable. As a condition of probation, the defendant must "par-
ticipate in and successfully complete a treatment program for sexually dangerous
persons." OR. REV. STAT. § 426.675(3)(a) (1987). The trial judge imposed treatment
on Bateman. See infra note 149 and accompanying text for the complete list of condi-
tions imposed.
3. Silverman, A Modern Day Scarlet Letter for Sex Offender, 9 NAT'L L.J., August
31, 1987 at 8. See Scarlet Letter' Sentence OK'd By Oregon Court, 10 NAT'L L.J., (No-
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An Urbana, Illinois circuit court judge requires convicted drunk
drivers to publicly apologize for their crimes by publishing an adver-
tisement in their local newspaper. The advertisement must include a
picture of the offender, a description of the crime and an apology to the
citizens of the area.4
In Florida, a trial court required a convicted drunk driver to affix
bumper stickers to his car reading "CONVICTED D.U.I. - RE-
STRICTED LICENSE" as a condition of probation.5
This Recent Development discusses the constitutionality of such
'scarlet letter' probation conditions.6 Section I briefly outlines the his-
tory of probation. Section II explains the nature of probation including
its definition, process and its intended purposes and rationales. Section
III discusses state probation statutes, probation conditions, and the dis-
cretion these statutes offer trial judges in granting probation and setting
special conditions. Section IV examines judicial review and responses
vember 23, 1987, at 9 (appellate court lifted stay of an order requiring posting of warn-
ing signs); See also infra note 153 and accompanying text for the judge's comments and
rationale for imposing this special condition.
4. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of published apol-
ogies and the text of ads.
5. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 496
So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986) discussed infra notes 116-25, 130-33 and accompanying text.
6. For purposes of this Recent Development, a 'scarlet letter' probation condition
requires the defendant to disclose publicly the nature of his crime and to identify him-
self as the perpetrator.
The term 'scarlet letter' is taken from Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel The Scarlet Let-
ter about a Puritan woman accused of adultery and required to wear a red letter 'A' on
her clothing. Magistrates used such badges of infamy in Puritan Massachusetts.
Kealey, Patterns of Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsr. 163 (April 1986). This badge and other public punishments and "sham-
ing techniques" such as "branding, cutting off an ear, exposure in the pillory, sitting in a
gallows with a rope around the neck, or standing in a public place with a sign proclaim-
ing the offense" were commonplace. Id. at 163-64.
The Puritan society believed that the imposition of the aforementioned punishments
would lead to the transgressor's reformation. A more frequent punishment consisted of
whipping, which aimed to reinforce the law by announcing the infraction to the com-
munity and involving the community in its denunciation. However, whipping did not
foster reformation. Id. at 172.
These conditions are referred to as "a new mark of Cain." See Zelevansky, Criminal
Justice: 'Consider A New Mark of Cain,' New York Times, Dec. 2, 1983, at A26, col. 3
where the author notes with approval the imposition of a condition that a convicted
drunk driver attach a bumper sticker "warning other motorists of his past offenses and
present probationary status." The author states that "[c]riminals should be made to feel
directly responsible for the pain and destruction they cause. In that might lie some
hope of rehabilitation." Id
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to constitutionally challenged probation conditions. Section V consid-
ers the constitutionality of 'scarlet letter' probation conditions and cri-
tiques this recent development in the law.
SECTION I - A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROBATION
Probation descends directly from the common law doctrine of recog-
nizance.7 Under this doctrine, a court would release the defendant
from custody, with a third party acting as surety, if the accused swore
to "keep the peace" or "be of good behavior."8 The surety, a forerun-
ner to the modem-day probation officer, was responsible for enforcing
the accused's oath and returning him to court if he failed to keep his
promise.9 Massachusetts enacted the nation's first probation statute in
1878.10 Today, all fifty states" and the federal govemment 12 have pro-
7. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonable-
ness is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J. L. AND SOC. PROBS. 45, 47 (1981). To some extent,
probation's heritage also includes the common law doctrines of benefit of clergy and
reprieve. Both doctrines offered courts an alternative to meting out punishment or or-
dering incarceration. Id.
Courts granted the benefit of clergy privilege to religious personnel as a means of
avoiding punishment in secular courts. Judges later extended the privilege to secular
clerks and literate individuals. Id at 48 (citing C. CHURT & M. BELL, CRIME,
COURTS, AND PROBATION (1956)).
Reprieve was a temporary order blocking the execution of a sentence to allow the
defendant to seek a pardon. Courts used reprieve in doubtful cases "where the judge is
not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the indictment is insuffi-
cient, or he is doubtful whether the offense be within clergy; or sometimes if it be a small
felony, or any favorable circumstances appear in the criminal character..... Green-
berg, supra at 48 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES).
8. Greenberg, supra note 7, at 48.
9. Id. Massachusetts and New York adopted this procedure, referred to as "laying
on file," in the seventeenth century. Id.
A Boston cobbler and frequent surety, John Augustus, was the original probation
officer. Augustus first stood surety in 1841 and referred to his task as "bailing on proba-
tion." Id. at 48-49 (citing J. AUGUSTUS, A REPORT ON THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUS-
TUS FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS (Boston 1852), reprinted in NATIONAL PROBATION
ASSOCIATION, JOHN AUGUSTUS 1, 4 (1939)). During his seventeen year career, Augus-
tus stood surety for 1,946 offenders. He not only enforced his charges' court-ordered
good behavior but also evaluated the defendant's background. He also suggested appro-
priate case dispositions to the court, found jobs for adult probationers and guardians for
minor offenders and ensured that minor offenders attended school. Greenberg, supra
note 7, at 49.
10. Greenberg, supra note 7, at 49. Entitled "An Act relative to placing on proba-
tion persons accused or convicted of crimes and misdemeanors in the county of Suf-
folk," the law outlined duties for county probation officers. Id. at 49-50. Two years
later, the statute extended coverage to all cities and towns. Id. Under the original law,
1990]
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bation statutes.
SECTION II - THE NATURE OF PROBATION
Generally, probation is the suspension of a sentence that conditions
liberty on professional supervision, court imposed conditions, and a
revocation provision triggered by failure to comply with the conditions
imposed.13 While courts use probation as an alternative to incarcera-
the mayor of Boston appointed probation officers. An 1891 statute transferred this ap-
pointment power to judges. Id.
11. ALA. CODE § 15-22-50 (1982 & Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090
(1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (1978 & Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-
4-301 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-11-201 (1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4301 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.001
(West 1985 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-1 (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 706-620 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 (1987 & Supp. 1988);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-38-2-1 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.1 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1988); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4601 (Vernon 1971 & Supp 1989); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1988); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 (West 1969 & Supp. 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 1201 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE § 27-641 (1988 & Supp.); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 279, §§ 1-lA (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 771.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-1 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 599.012 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (1985); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2250 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.175 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 651:2 (1986 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b)(2) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-5 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (Consol.
1984 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1341 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
32-02 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.01 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1988); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.520
(1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-19-2 (1981 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-410 (Law. Co-op.
1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-12 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-
101 (1982 & Supp. 1988); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (Vernon 1979 &
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (1982 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 201 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (1983 & Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.95.200 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-1 (1989); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 973.09 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1987).
12. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837,
1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3672, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(Supp. III 1985)) (section 3656 redesignated as 18 U.S.C. § 3672). See infra notes 35-37
and accompanying text discussing this new Act.
13. R. MONTGOMERY, JR. & S. DILLINGHAM, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN PRAC-
TICE 4 (1983).
Some state statutes define probation. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 1982 &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/11
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tion, courts do not view probation as the equivalent of a sentence. Pro-
bation uses a "carrot and stick" approach to achieve compliance with
imposed conditions. When the court places a defendant on probation,
the trial judge imposes specific conditions (the "carrot") that the pro-
bationer must follow throughout the probation period. Intentional fail-
ure to comply with one or more conditions may result in a revocation
hearing and imposition of the original sentence (the "stick").14 Suc-
cessful completion of the conditions discharges the defendant from lia-
bility for the crime committed."5 The defendant's fulfillment of the
imposed conditions also achieves probation's goals. Traditionally, pro-
bation's purpose, justification and goal has been the defendant's reha-
bilitation.' 6 Consequently, courts impose probation conditions to
assist defendants in successful reformation and to reintegrate the de-
fendants into society. 17
Supp. 1989) ("probation shall mean the suspension of the imposition or execution of a
sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the community under the
supervision of the probation officer."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.001 (2) (West 1985)
(" 'probation' means a form of community supervision requiring specified contacts with
parole and probation officers and other terms and conditions as provided in [the stat-
ute]"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988) ("[p]robation is the proce-
dure under which a defendant, against whom a judgment of conviction of a public
offense may be entered, is released by the court subject to supervision by a resident of
this state or by the judicial district department of correctional services"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-21-5(A) (1987) ("probation means the procedure under which an adult de-
fendant, found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea, is released by the court without
imprisonment under a suspended or deferred sentence and subject to conditions").
14. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (fourteenth amendment due
process rights require a hearing prior to revocation of probation).
15. Montgomery & Dillingham, supra note 13, at 5. See also N. COHEN & J.
GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 13 (1983) (satisfactory completion of
the probationary period occurs in approximately 60% to 90% of all cases).
16. On this, state legislatures, courts and commentators agree. See, e.g., ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 27.1 (1987) ("The sentencing court
may impose ... such conditions as will promote rehabilitation."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4301 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-4 (1987) (the purpose of the probation
statute is a "uniformly organized system of constructive rehabilitation."); State v. Es-
dale, 253 Ala. 550, 45 So. 2d 865 (1950) (probation's goal is to give the defendant a
chance to show he might rehabilitate and become an acceptable citizen); State v. Darrin,
325 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1982) (probation must promote rehabilitation and protection of
the community); In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1979) and
Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) petition denied 401 So. 2d
1334 (Fla. 1981) (purpose of probation is to foster rehabilitation); Best and Birzon,
Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEO L.J. 809, 810 (1963) and Greenberg,
supra note 7, at 54-55 (society's protection is an implied goal of probation).
17. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303(a) (1987) (If the court places the defend-
ant on probation, conditions should attach that "are reasonably necessary to assist the
1990]
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In 1970 the American Bar Association endorsed probation as a de-
sirable disposition in appropriate cases because:
(i) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same
time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting
the public from further violations of the law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender
by continuing normal community contacts; (iii) it avoids the
negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement which
often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of
the offender into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury
of an effective correctional system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent de-
pendents of the offender. 8
As noted previously, society considers probation as an alternative to
sentencing. 9 An increasing number of states, however, are treating
probation as a sentence.20 Additionally, courts are reconsidering their
defendant in leading a law-abiding life."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204(1) (1986) and
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (conditions shall ensure and
assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.)
18. ABA STANDARD RELATING TO PROBATION 27 (Approved Draft 1970).
Regarding item (iii), see also U.S. Dept. of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration, COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STAN-
DARDS (2d ed. June 1975) at III [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] (probation and
community supervision offers more hope than institutionalization because the defendant
will not enter the depressing cycle which makes the prison gates resemble a revolving
door rather than a barrier to crime). See also PROBATION IN PRACTIcE, supra note 13,
at 2 (incarceration is not the best primary punishment technique given overcrowded
prison conditions, staggering economic costs and harmless defendants to the
community).
19. See, eg., Pickett v. Boykin, 118 Ariz. 261, 262, 576 P.2d 120, 121 (1978) (proba-
tion is not a sentence but a suspension of imposition of a sentence); Freeman v. State,
382 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. App. 1980); State v. Pietrowski, 136 N.J. Super. 383, 346
A.2d 427, 429 (1975) ("[tjhere is a clear distinction between a sentence and a condition
of probation").
Most statutes treat probation as an alternative applied after suspending a sentence or
in lieu of imposing one. See eg., ALA. CODE § 15-22-50 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (circuit
and district courts have the authority to suspend sentence and place convicted person
on parole); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34(c) (1985 & Supp. 1988) (court can put defendant
on probation if he is not likely to engage in criminal acts); MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-33
(1981) (probation allowed if it serves the ends of justice and is in the best interest of the
public and the defendant). See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4302(13) (1987) ("probation" means sen-
tencing an offender, without imprisonment, by judgment of the court following estab-
lishment of guilt); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1982 &
Supp. 1988) (probation is an appropriate disposition); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/11
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views on probation.2
The distinction between probation as a sentencing alternative and
probation as a sentence itself is important.22 A sentence is the punish-
ment or penalty society exacts from a convicted defendant for his
crime. The traditional rationales for punishing criminal behavior are
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.23 Thus, if
courts use probation as a sentence, its function must expand to include
retribution and deterrence as well as its traditional goals of rehabilita-
tion and public protection.
While courts traditionally neither viewed nor applied probation as a
punishment24 this attitude has changed. In 1982, commentator James
Weissman identified four "converging influences" that modify proba-
tion's traditional functions.25 The trend of these modifications is to
treat probation as a sentence. These influences and their impact on
probation include: 1) replacing the "rehabilitative ideal" in the crimi-
nal justice system with "sentencing values advocating retribution" re-
4603(2) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989) (dispositions available to the court after conviction
are imprisonment, fine or probation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2246(4) (1985) ("Proba-
tion shall mean a sentence under which a person found guilty of a crime... is released
by a court subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to supervision.");
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(1) (1986 & Supp. 1988) ("A person convicted of a fel-
ony or misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment, probation, conditional or un-
conditional discharges, or a fine."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b) (West 1982 & Supp.
1988) (except where prohibited, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense
to pay a fine or make restitution and to go on probation or face imprisonment).
21. See, e.g., Epps v. Levine, 457 F. Supp. 561, 570 (D. Md. 1978) (state courts can
still transfer pretrial detainees to the state correctional division).
22. "There is a clear distinction between a sentence and a condition of probation
(citation omitted). A sentence may be imposed for one or more of the following pur-
poses: (a) to punish; (b) to deter similar criminal acts; (c) to protect society; or (d) to
rehabilitate. [Probation's] underlying concept is rehabilitation." Freeman v. State, 382
So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1980).
23. Montgomery & Dillingham, supra note 13, at 3.
24. See Viel v. Potter, 20 Conn. Supp. 173, 129 A.2d 230 (1957) in which the court
stated:
[p]robation is not ordered for the purpose of punishment for the wrong for which
there has been a conviction or for general wrongdoing. Its aim is reformatory and
not punitive. It is to bring one who has fallen into evil ways under oversight and
influences which may lead him to a better living. The end sought is the good of the
individual wrongdoer, and not his punishment.
Id. at 176-77, 129 A.2d at 232.
25. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern Probation Conditions, 8 NEW ENG.
J. ON PRISON L. 367 (1982).
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suiting in probation becoming a "just deserts" sanction;26 2) prominent
proposals by the American Bar Association27 and the Uniform Law
Commissioner2  making probation the preferred sentencing option
over incarceration;29 3) prison overcrowding and consequent litigation
resulting in the creation and imposition of specialized probation condi-
26. Id. at 367-68. The court, in United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d
911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982), implicitly equated probation with punishment and stated that
"[t]he deterrent effect of punishment is heightened if it inflicts disgrace and contumely
in a dramatic and spectacular manner." Id. United States v. Missouri Valley Construc-
tion Company, 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984), overruled the William Anderson case.
The Missouri Valley court carefully pointed out the continuing validity of William An-
derson's general analysis of probation. Id. at 1550. See Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d
123 (Fla. App. Dist Ct. 1986) (although decided two years after William Anderson was
overruled, the decision relied heavily on the William Anderson philosophy).
27. American Bar Association, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures in STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.3(a) & (d) (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986). These
sections provide:
(a) The legislature should authorize the sentencing authorities to consider a sen-
tence of probation or a similar sentence not involving confinement for all crime
categories. As used in these standards, the term "probation" means a sentence not
involving confinement which imposes conditions and retains authority in the sen-
tencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to resentence the offender
if its conditions are violated.
(d) Probation conditions should not be required by statute, other than for the gen-
eral condition that the probationer lead a law-abiding life during the period of
probation. The sentencing court should be authorized to individualize the condi-
tions of probation to fit the circumstances of each case. Development of standard
probation conditions and guidelines concerning their use is desirable and should be
addressed..., but the sentencing court should not mechanically impose the same
conditions in all cases.
Id.
28. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, MODEL SEN-
TENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-102(4) (1979). Section 3-102(4) provides that:
Sentences not involving confinement should be preferred unless:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who
has a long history of criminal conduct;
(ii) confinement is necessary to avoid deprecating the seriousness of the offense
or justly to punish the defendant;
(iii) confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrent to others
likely to commit similar offenses;
(iv) measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been
applied unsuccessfully to the defendant; or
(v) the purposes of this Article would be fulfilled only by a sentence involving
confinement.
Id.
29. Weissman, supra note 25, at 368. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text
for 1970 A.B.A. Standards Relating to Probation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/11
SIGNS OF THE TIME
tions such as weekend jail confinement,3" commitment to a halfway
house,3 1 and stricter reporting requirements32 which increase the
court's capacity to monitor a probationer's activities and grant proba-
tion to perpetrators of more serious crimes;3 3 and, 4) increased prose-
cution of white-collar crime and effective punishment for these "non-
traditional criminals" leading to creative sentencing, usually probation
with reparation conditions such as fines, restitution and community
service.34
The Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 19843" illustrates this trend
30. See, eg., W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (intermittent jail confinement provision).
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(8) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988)
("reside in a residential community center or halfway house approved by the commis-
sioner of correction, and contribute to the cost incident to such residence.")
32. See, eg., LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art 895(a)(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989)
(defendant shall make a full and truthful report at the end of each month).
33. Weissman, supra note 25, at 369. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-21-430(9)
and (11) (Law. Co-op 1989) (probationer may have to submit to curfew restrictions or
intensive surveillance which may include surveillance by electronic means). Many
states include provisions permitting the court to require confinement in either a jail or
halfway house. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.086 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-6-3(b)(1) and (5) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
38-2-2(a)(3) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3(2)(a) (West
1982 & Supp. 1988). Statutes also include provisions allowing courts to require proba-
tioners to remain within the court's jurisdiction unless allowed to leave by the court or
probation officer. See, eg., HAW. Rv. STAT. § 706-624(1)(c) (1985 & Supp. 1987); see
also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
Prison overcrowding is such a problem that states are forced to find alternate sites for
incarceration facilities. See The far shore of America's bulging prisons, 105 U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT 11 (November 14, 1988). (States utilize barges in the middle of
rivers, temporary canvas tents, trailers, and converted schools and hospitals to house
inmates). The article notes the U.S. prison population will reach one million before
1990. Id.
Another factor is the expense of housing inmates. A recent article estimates the an-
nual cost of housing one inmate is around $20,000. In contrast, community monitoring
and probation costs roughly $3,600 per person per year. ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING,
73 A.B.A. J. 32 (November 1, 1987).
34. Weissman, supra note 25, at 369-70. See, e.g., United States v. Carlston, 562 F.
Supp. 181, 182-83 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (convicted tax evader required to purchase com-
puters and teach probationers and parolees how to use them.). See also United States v.
William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court mentioned, with
approval, a case in which corporate antitrust defendants were placed on probation and
required to address civic groups about the evils of price-fixing).
35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559,
3561-3566, 3571-3672, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. III 1985)) (§ 3656 redesignated at
18 U.S.C. § 3672). This Act, effective on November 1, 1987, replaces the Federal Pro-
bation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1982).
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toward viewing probation as a sentence. The Act treats probation as a
sentence rather than a sentencing alternative.3 6 Sentences and, by im-
plication, probation must:
reflect the seriousness of the offense .... promote respect for the
law and provide just punishment for the offense, . . . afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal conduct,. . . protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant, ... [and] provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.37
Thus, changing attitudes on probation suggest that, although reha-
bilitation remains a driving force, probation is evolving into a broad,
flexible means of dispensing criminal justice. Likewise, criminal justice
philosophy is expanding the use of probation as an affirmative correc-
tional device and sentence.38
SECTION III - PROBATION STATUTES AND CONDITIONS
Statutes grant courts broad discretion in determining whether proba-
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (Supp. III 1985) ("An individual found guilty of an offense
shall be sentenced ... to... a term of probation .... ); see also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3271 ("In
keeping with modem criminal justice philosophy, probation is described as a form of
sentence rather than, as in current law, a suspension of the imposition or execution of
sentence.")
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. III 1985). A detailed discussion and analysis of the
Federal Sentencing Reform Act is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For a
brief general discussion of the Act, see PROJECT Seventeenth Annual Review of Crim-
inal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987: IV
Sentencing, Probation, and Parole, 76 GEo. L.J. 1073, 1166-82 [hereinafter PROJECT]
(1988). Compare traditional sentencing goals discussed infra notes 22 & 23 and accom-
panying text with PROJECT at 1166-74 presenting a modem view on probation.
A new California statute reflects broader probation functions. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). Under the statute, a California court granting
probation "may impose and require any... reasonable conditions, as it may determine
are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to
society for the breach of law, for any injury done to any person resulting from such
breach and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the pro-
bationer." Id. See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606 (1985 & Supp. 1987) (sentence for
offense of murder).
38. "[P]robation can be imposed for purposes other than rehabilitation. By the use
of appropriate conditions, probation can serve such legitimate goals as retribution, de-
terrence, and incapacitation." COHEN & GOBERT supra note 15, at 26. See also CoM-
PENDIUM, supra note 18, at 111-1; People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812-13,
130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1976) (probation's advantage as an alternative to incarceration
is that courts can tailor terms to fit the individual defendant.)
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tion is an appropriate disposition for a particular defendant.39 As a
statutory creation derived solely from legislative "grace" which courts
grant at their discretion," probation is a privilege, not a right.41 In
determing whether probation should apply in a particular case, judges
resort to investigative presentence reports, usually prepared by the
court's probation service, and statutory guidelines.
The presentence report is a detailed document that includes the de-
fendant's history and background, the nature and circumstances sur-
rounding the offense, the results of professional observation, physical
and psychological examinations and other information to aid the
judge's decision.42 The report may also include specific recommenda-
tions to the judge regarding potential probation conditions.43 In some
states, the presentence report is a statutory requirement that must be
fulfilled prior to granting or denying probation.'
Probation statutes grant courts broad discretion in deciding whether
39. See State v. Darrin, 325 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1982) (trial court granted wide dis-
cretion in granting probation subject only to provisions that the grant shall promote
rehabilitation and community protection); State v. Evans, 127 N.H. 501, 504-05, 506
A.2d 695, 698 (1985) (trial court has broad discretion to grant probation in order to
achieve goals of punishment, deterrence, safety and rehabilitation); See also supra note
11 for citations to probation statutes and infra notes 46 and 47 and accompanying text
illustrating the discretion probation statutes offer judges.
40. People v. Main, 152 Cal. App.3d 686, 693, 199 Cal Rptr. 683, 686 (1984). Some
view probation as a contract between the state and the probationer. Under this theory,
probation offers exemption from incarceration if the defendant agrees to abide by the
imposed conditions. By entering into the contract, the probationer may not later appeal
the conditions. For many reasons, the Supreme Court rejected this theory and several
circuit courts attacked it. Greenberg, supra note 7, at 57-60.
41. Weissman, supra note 25, at 371. See, eg., Main, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 199
Cal. Rptr. at 686 (legislature grants probation as a privilege, not a right); State v.
DeCourcy, 224 Kan. 278, 280, 580 P.2d 86, 88 (1978) (probation is privilege, not a
right). But see People v. Free, 112 Ill. App. 3d 449, 456, 445 N.E.2d 529, 534 (1983)
(when a statute grants defendant eligibility for probation, trial court consideration of
probation is mandatory).
42. Best & Birzon, supra note 16, at 814-15.
43. Id. at 815. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332 (1987) ("The pre-sentence
report may recommend conditions to be imposed by the court."); People v. Dominguez,
256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (1967) ("The probation officer recom-
mended that appellant be granted probation on specified conditions. .. ").
44. Best & Birzon, supra note 16, at 815. See, eg., NEB. REV. STAT. § 176.135(1)
(1987) which states:
"The department of parole and probation shall make a presentence investigation and
report to the court on each defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is
found guilty of a felony. The report must be made before the imposition of sentence or
the granting of probation. .. ."
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to grant probation and what conditions to impose.4 5 State legislatures
often suggest factors a judge should consider before granting probation.
These may be stated broadly, giving the judge near absolute discre-
46tion, or may present detailed criteria.4 7 Most state statutes clearly
identify those defendants ineligible for probation. Frequently, ineligi-
ble defendants have committed crimes punishable by life imprisonment
Id. Presentence reports for misdemeanants are optional at the court's request. Id. at
§ 176.135(2).
45. See supra note 11 listing state probation statutes.
46. For example, Connecticut's statute provides:
The court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of any
crime, other than a class A felony, if it is of the opinion that: (1) present or ex-
tended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protec-
tion of the public; (2) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or assistance
which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision;
and (3) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29(a) (West 1985). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01
(West 1985 & Supp. 1989) and GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34(c) (1985 & Supp. 1988) (pro-
bation is appropriate when the court believes the defendant is unlikely to repeatedly
manifest criminal conduct and when the ends of justice and society's welfare do not
require the defendant to suffer the penalty imposed by law).
47. Colorado's statute, for example, provides:
Criteria for granting probation. (1) The court, subject to the provisions of this title,
in its discretion may grant probation to a defendant unless, having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the offense and to the history and character of the
defendant, it is satisfied that imprisonment is the more appropriate sentence for the
protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during a period of probation the defendant will
commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can most effectively
be provided by a sentence to imprisonment... ; or
(c) A sentence to probation will unduly depreciate the seriousness of the defend-
ant's crime or undermine respect for the law; or
(d) His past criminal record indicates that probation would fail to accomplish its
intended purposes; or
(e) The crime, the facts surrounding it, or the defendant's history and character
when considered in relation to statewide sentencing practices relating to persons in
circumstances substantially similar to those of the defendant do not justify the
granting of probation.
(2) The following factors, or the converse thereof where appropriate, while not
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or death.4" Some statutes, however, encompass a broader class of ineli-
gible criminals.49
State probation statutes typically contain provisions regarding pro-
controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in making determi-
nations called for by subsection (1) of this section:
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm to another person or his property;
(b) The defendant did not plan or expect that his criminal conduct would cause
or threaten serious harm to another person or his property;
(c) The defendant acted under strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds which, though insufficient to establish a legal
defense, tend to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct;
(e) The victim of the defendant's conduct induced or facilitated its commission;
(f) The defendant has made or will make restitution or reparation to the victim
of his conduct for the damage or injury which was sustained;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior criminal activity or has led a law-
abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present
offense;
(h) The defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur;
(i) The character, history, and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is un-
likely to commit another crime;
(j) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary
treatment;
(k) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail undo hardship to himself or
his dependents;
(1) The defendant is elderly or in poor health;
(m) The defendant did not abuse a public position of responsibility or trust;
(n) The defendant cooperated with law enforcement authorities by bringing
other offenders to justice, or otherwise;
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require explicit reference to these
factors in a presentence report or by the court at sentencing.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-203 (1986). See also HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-621 (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (enumerates "[flactors to be considered in imposing a term of probation").
48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(1) (West 1985) (death); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-8-34(c) (1985 & Supp. 1988) and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-12 (1988)
(death or life imprisonment); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.010(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1985) (probation appropriate for any person not sentenced to death); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1341(a) (1988) (life imprisonment).
49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-604 (1978 & Supp. 1988) (dangerous
repetitive offenders); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-301(a) (1987) (defendants guilty of capital
murder, first and second degree murder, first degree rape, kidnapping, aggravated rob-
bery or previously convicted of two or more felonies); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-201-
(2) (1986) (twice convicted felons, persons convicted of class I felony or class 2 petty
offense); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (extensive list of per-
sons ineligible for probation); IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 (1987) (persons convicted for
treason or murder); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.1(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988)
(defendants convicted of murder, treason, first or third degree criminal sexual assault,
armed robbery or major controlled substance offenses).
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bation conditions and give trial courts broad discretion in determining
conditions to impose.50 Most statutes list conditions from which the
court must choose. In its discretion, the court may choose any combi-
nation, or all, of the conditions.
A. General Conditions
Many state legislatures drafted and enacted probation statutes with
rehabilitation as the goal. Therefore, many enumerated conditions
serve to assist the probationer in reforming and becoming a productive
citizen.51 Additionally, the conditions assist the probation service or
50. See: ALA. CODE § 15-22-52 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100 (1984); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (1978 & Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303 (1987);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204
(1986 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-624 (1985 & Supp.
1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-2601(2) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3
(Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2 (Burns 1985 & Supp.
1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN.
§ 21-4610 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895
(West 1969 & Supp. 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204 (1983 & Supp.
1988); MD. ANN. CODE § 27-641 (1988 & Supp.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, §§ 1, IA
(Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 47-7-35 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 599.021 (Vernon 1979 &
Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-201-202 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2262
(1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.185 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(v) (1986 &
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20-6 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07 (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2951.02 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 991a (West 1987 & Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137.540 (1984); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1988); RI. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430 (Law. Co-op. (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 23A-27-18.1 - 18.3 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303 (1982 & Supp. 1988);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12(6) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 77-18-1(5) (1982 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252 (1986); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-305 (1983 & Supp. 1988); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.210
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.09 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 7-13-301-302 (1987).
51. See, e.g.: ALA. CODE § 15-22-52(1) (1982) and GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35(1)
(1985) (avoid injurious or vicious habits); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4610(3)(b)
(Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(b) (Consol. 1984)(avoid
disreputable persons or places); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303(c)(2) (1987) and ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-A)(C) (1983) (work faithfully at suitable and approved
employment); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(a)(3) (1984) (support his or her dependents);
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court in monitoring the probationer to ensure that he leads a law-abid-
ing life.52 Under certain conditions, the court may exercise control
over the defendant's mobility.53 Some conditions require the proba-
tioner to compensate the victim or society for losses suffered as a result
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(7) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) and NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2262(2)(a) (1985) (abstain from further crimes); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-
2-2-(a)(1) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(4) (Pur-
don 1982) (pursue a prescribed course of secular study); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-2
04(2)(g) (1986) and HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-624(2)(i) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (abstain
from alcohol or drugs); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(d)(e) (Consol. 1984) and OR.
REv. STAT. § 137.540(2)(c), (1984) (undergo medical or psychological treatment in-
cluding drug and alcohol treatment); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303(c)(7) (1987) and LA.
CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 895(A)(6) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989)(do not possess fire-
arms or dangerous weapons). For states that impose some unique conditions, see: OR.
REv. STAT. § 137.540(2)(i) (1984) (take antabuse, a drug used to treat alcoholism, if
medically approved); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(a)(19) (Vernon
1979 & Supp. 1989) (participate in a program that teaches functional illiterates to read);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895(A)(10) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989) (enroll in and
pay for an approved reading program if unable to read English).
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(l)(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) and S.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-21-430(4) (Law. Co-op. 1989)(permiting the probation officer to visit
the probationer at home, work, or elsewhere); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204(2)(k)
(1986) and KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533.030(2)(k) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp.
1988)(answer all reasonable inquiries); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1982 & Supp.
1989)(keep track of earnings and report them to the probation officer); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 137.540(2)(e),(j)(1984) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430(8) (Law. Co-op. 1989)(sub-
mit to drug or alcohol testing through breath analysis, blood tests, or urinalysis); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 706.624(l)(e)(1985 & Supp. 1987)(notify the probation officer if arrested
or questioned by a law enforcement officer); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
895(A)(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988)(make full and truthful monthly report of activi-
ties); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(bl)(7)(1988) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-
07(2)(o)(1985)(submit to warrantless searches to car or premises); OR. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 137-540(2)(b)(1984)(and submit to polygraph tests).
53. These conditions allow courts to grant probation to more serious offenders. See
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (illustrating such probation conditions). For
examples of mobility restricting conditions, see: ALA. CODE § 15-22-52(6) (1982), KAN.
CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4610(3)(f) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989) and IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-38-2-2(a)(l 1) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988)(defendant must remain within the
court's jurisdiction or in a specified place); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2(c) (Burns 1985
& Supp. 1988) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(bl)(2) (1988)(remain confined to ajail
or halfway house for a period of time or intermittently); IND. CODE ANN § 35-38-2-
2(a)(12) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988) and ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-
A)(H) (1983)(notify the court or probation officer of changes in address or employ-
ment); HAw. REv. STAT. § 706- 6 24(2)(p) (1985 & Supp.1987) and N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:2(v) (1986 & Supp. 1988)(remain under house arrest); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-21-430(9) (Law. Co-op. 1989)(submit to curfew restrictions); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.016 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(v) (1986 &
Supp. 1988), S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430(11) (Law. Co-op 1989)(submit to intensive
surveillance or electronic monitoring).
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of the criminal act.5 4 Other conditions reflect contemporary legislative
concerns." While most legislatures grant the judge broad discretion to
determine which conditions to impose, some jurisdictions require the
judge to impose certain conditions on all probationers. 6 Alternatively,
54. See, e.g., KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4610(3)(g),(4)(b) (Vernon 1971 & Supp.
1989) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(9) (1988)(defendant must pay court costs
and/or probation fees); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-901(A) (1978 & Supp. 1988) and
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.021.2(1) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989)(pay restitution or per-
form reparation to the victim); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.031 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989)
and MD. ANN. CODE § 27-641(a)(1)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1988)(perform community ser-
vice); NEV. REv. STAT. § 176.189(1) (1987)(pay for the victim's medical or psychologi-
cal treatment necessitated by the defendant's crime); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-6-5(b)(12) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(E)
(1988)(reimburse local anti-crime program for costs incurred in the defendant's arrest
or contribute to a local anti-crime program); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 991a(A)(1)(f)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1989) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1(5)(b) (1982 & Supp.
1988)(reimburse'the state general fund for counsel/defense provided); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-18.3 (1988)(pay for the defendant's own medical, psychological,
or substance abuse treatment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.210(4) (West
1988)(contribute to local or county drug fund); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(6)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988) and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030(2)(e) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1989)(or post bond conditioned on performance of the
conditions).
55. In the wake of the AIDS epidemic, some states permit or require the defendant
to submit to and pay for confidential AIDS testing. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-5-3(g),(h) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-
2(a)(16) (Bums '1985 & Supp. 1988).
56. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303(b) (1987) and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-11-204(1) (1986)(defendant must not commit another crime); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 706-624(1)(b) (1985 & Supp. 1987) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(3) (1988)(re-
port to probation officer as directed); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 771.3(1)(0) (West
1982 & Supp. 1988) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02(C) (Anderson 1987 & Supp.
1988)(not leave the state unless granted permission); HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-624(1)(d)
(1985 & Supp. 1987) and OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(l)(g) (1984)(notify the probation
officer or court prior to or of changes in addresses or employment); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 706-624(1)(e) (1985 & Supp. 1987)(notify the probation officer if arrested or ques-
tioned by a law enforcement officer); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-3(a)(5)
(Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988)(permit the probation officer to visit the defendant at
home or elsewhere); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-204(1) (1986) and OR. REV.
STAT. § 137.540(1)(k) (1984)(refrain from possessing any firearms or dangerous weap-
ons); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4610(4)(0) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989) and TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-28-201(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1988)(pay probation fee); KAN. CRIM.
CODE ANN. § 21-4610(4)(c) (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989) and OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 137.540(1)(k) (1984)(reimburse the state for counsel/defense expenses); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 65.10(3)(c) (Consol. 1984) and N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(3) (1988)(an-
swer all reasonable inquiries); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(7),(8) (1988)(work
faithfully at suitable employment and notify the probation officer if unable to find a job);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(9) (1988) and OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1)(k)
(1984)(pay court costs); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(9) (1988)(pay a fine); LA.
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some statutes require the judge to impose certain conditions on the
perpetrators of specifically enumerated crimes.57
B. "Other" or "Special" Conditions
Many statutes include a provision that the defendant "satisfy any
other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation and the pur-
poses of probation.""8 This provision allows the trial judge to create
and impose individualized conditions, such as 'scarlet letter' condi-
tions. The court's discretion is limited only by the "reasonableness"
requirement.5 9 To fulfill this requirement, special conditions need
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895(A)(1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1989) and OR. REV.
STAT. § 137.540(l)(d) (1984)(make full and truthful reports each month); OR. REV.
STAT. § 137.540(l)(i) (1984) and VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (1983 & Supp. 1988)(sub-
mit to fingerprinting and photographing); N.M. STAT. § 31-20-6(E) (1988)(reimburse
law enforcement agency or local crime-stopper program for any reward paid by the
agency or program for information leading to the defendant's arrest, prosecution or
conviction).
57. For example, California requires defendants convicted of certain sex offenses to
totally abstain from alcohol if alcoholism or intoxication was manifest when the defend-
ant committed the offense. CAL. PENAL CODE. § 1203.02 (West 1982). Maryland re-
quires convicted drunk drivers to participate in an alcohol treatment or education
program. MD. CODE ANN. § 27-641(a)(1)(ii)(1) (1988 & Supp.). Similarly, Nebraska
requires mandatory counseling when the offender is guilty of assault and battery and the
victim is the defendant's spouse. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2262(3) (1985).
58. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-204(2)(1) (1986). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-
303(c)(10) (1987), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1(b)(12) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); and 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (Purdon 1982) (each statute provides that the
defendant must "satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation of the
defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
conscience"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(c)(9) (1982 & Supp. 1988) ("satisfy any
other conditions reasonably related to rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly
restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience or otherwise
prohibited by this chapter"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-30(a)(9) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1988), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2(a)(14) (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988), N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(1) (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1988), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1343(bl)(10) (1988) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 252(b)(13) (1986) (statutes provide
that the defendant must "satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabili-
tation"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-624(2)(n) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (satisfy other reason-
able conditions as the court may impose); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1204(2-
A)(M) (1983) (satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of
the convicted person or the public safety or security); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.540(2)
(1984) ("In addition to [mandatory enumerated] general conditions, the court may im-
pose special conditions of probation for the protection of the public or reformation of
the offender, or both, including but not limited to [further enumerated conditions]").
59. See infra note 83 and accompanying text for an articulation of the general fac-
tors for reasonableness.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
308 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 37:291
careful planning to meet the defendant's needs.'" Examples of such
conditions include requiring the probationer to: post signs on his resi-
dence and any vehicle he operates stating "DANGEROUS SEX OF-
FENDER - NO CHILDREN ALLOWED;"61 affix bumper stickers
to his car reading "CONVICTED D.U.I. - RESTRICTED LI-
CENSE; '62 refrain from sexual intercourse with anyone other than his
.63spouse; wear taps on the soles and heels of his shoes;64 speak to civic
groups on the evils of price fixing;6 5 publish apologies in local newspa-
pers with a recitation of the offense(s); 66 and attend church weekly.67
SECTION IV - JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
CHALLENGED PROBATION CONDITIONS
The traditional standard of review for any probation condition is
60. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979). Indeed, this is one of
the benefits of a court's discretion to impose special conditions. See People v. McDow-
ell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843, (1976) ("One of the advan-
tages of probation.., is that its terms can be tailored by the court to fit the individual
defendant."). See also infra note 75 (further discussion of Tonry).
61. Silverman, supra note 3 at 8. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text for
discussion of this case.
62. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 496
So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986). See infra note 116-25, 130-33 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of this case.
63. Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See infra note 144
discussing this case.
64. People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976). For dis-
cussion of this case, see infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
65. See United States v. William Anderson Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir.
1982).
66. See Alternative Sentencing, A.B.A. J., November 1, 1987, at 32. See infra notes
156-60 and accompanying text for a description of this condition in practice.
67. Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 327 Pa. Super. 72, 83, 475 A.2d 103, 108 (1984). In
Kuhn, the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not strike down the condition that the de-
fendant attend church services. Rather, the court issued a warning to the state's trial
courts that such conditions may violate the first amendment, convicted Kuhn, a chronic
alcoholic, of burglary, theft, and causing or risking a catastrophe and sentenced him to
fifteen years probation. The sentencing judge stated that the purpose of the church
attendance condition would keep the defendant "within the light you have seen." Id.
The defendant did not appeal this condition. Nevertheless, the appeals court addressed
the condition's constitutionality with a cautionary note to trial courts, that such a re-
quirement probably violates the first amendment establishment clause. The court
pointed out that neither the possible effectiveness of the condition nor its general nature
(i.e., defendant could attend any church) were enough to legitimize it. Id.
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reasonableness.6" The condition must be reasonably related to the
crime committed, the defendant's rehabilitation, or the public safety.
Courts apply this standard even when the defendant raises a constitu-
tional challenge to the imposed condition.69 Generally, courts will up-
hold conditions impinging on constitutionally protected rights if the
condition is reasonably related to the crime committed or the defend-
ant's future criminality.70
A probationer's status lies somewhere between a prison inmate and a
free citizen.71 Whether probation is itself a sentence or it is granted
upon suspension of a sentence, the probationer remains a convicted
criminal. Therefore, probation may include conditions that would fail
to pass constitutional muster if the government attempted to impose
them on the citizenry at large. For example, state and federal courts
uphold conditions restricting probationers' freedom of speech and asso-
ciation, 72 freedom from warrantless searches, 73 right to earn a living in
one's chosen career74 and the right to hold political office.75 The "rea-
68. See State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) ("The test is one of reason-
ableness"); In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 146-48, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (1979)
("There is an overall requirement of reasonableness in relation to the seriousness of the
offense for which the defendant is onvicted .... There is no exact formula for the
determination of reasonableness. Each case must be decided on its own atmosphere").
69. For a discussion of reasonableness and constitutionality, see infra notes 70, 73-
76 and 86-145 and accompanying text.
70. See, eg., text accompanying supra note 91. See also Young v. State, 286 Ark.
413, 418, 692 S.W.2d 752, 755 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1070 (1986) (a probation
condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it restricts a probationer's ability to
exercise constitutionally protected rights as conditions are upheld if they bear a reason-
able relationship to the crime committed or to future criminality).
71. See text accompanying infra notes 108-09.
72. Commonwealth v. McBride, 289 Pa. Super. 396, 399, 433 A.2d 509, 511 (1981);
United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330
(10th Cir. 1971); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1124 (1975). See infra note 101 regarding first amendment protections.
73. State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987); State v. Lingle, 209 Neb.
492, 502, 308 N.W.2d 531, 537 (1981); State v. Culbertson, 29 Or. App. 363, 563 P.2d
1224 (1977); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); United States v. Williams, 787
F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1986). But see State v. Gawron, supra, at 1299 (Bistline, J., dissent-
ing) (warrantless searches are a great infringement on probationer's rights); United
States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (warrantless search invalid as no
independent search would have occurred).
Warrantless search conditions arguably violate the fourth amendment which guaran-
tees in pertinent part "It]he right... to be secure... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
74. MePike v. State, 473 So. 2d 291, 292-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In McPike,
the court found the defendant, a licensed physician, guilty of 22 counts of grand theft.
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sonableness" standard affords trial courts broad discretion in fashion-
ing special probation conditions. Although reviewing courts frequently
defer to a trial court's discretion, the standard is not without strin-
gency. Hence, a court will not hesitate to invalidate conditions it be-
lieves unreasonable.76
McPike's sentence included 3 years in state prison and 10 years probation. Fifteen
years prior to the 1985 trial, McPike received and completed treatment for a Demoral
addiction. As a special condition, the court mandated that McPike not prescribe
medicine for others. Id. McPike appealed arguing that the condition impacted his fun-
damental right to earn a livelihood by any lawful calling. On appeal, the District Court
of Appeals of Florida for the Second District held this condition improper because it did
not reasonably relate to McPike's rehabilitation, provide a standard of conduct essential
to protect the public and did not have any relationship to the crime of grand theft. Id.
Additionally, the court believed that prescribing drugs was not a criminal act inasmuch
as it was related to the practice of medicine and the condition was not reasonably re-
lated to future criminality. However, because McPike failed to raise an objection to the
condition at trial and the condition did not abrogate McPike's fundamental right (it
merely impacted on it), the court affirmed the condition. Id. See also United States v.
Tolla, 781 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (court prevented defendant from teaching for one year
as a probation condition); United States v. Brockway, 769 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.
1985)(court prevented defendant sheriff from holding a position as a law enforcement
officer during the probation period); United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.
1984)(appellate court allowed condition of probation of not holding a proprietary inter-
est in a scale business during probation); HAW. REv. STAT. § 706-624(2)(g) (1985 &
Supp. 1987) (court may require, as probation condition, that defendant "[riefrain from
engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct
relationship to the conduct constituting the crime.").
75. United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1979). In Tonry, the court
adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition unduly intrudes
on constitutionally protected rights. Under the test:
The conditions must be "reasonably related" to the purposes of the Act [here the
Federal Probation Act]. Consideration of three factors is required to determine
whether a reasonable relationship exists: (I) the purposes sought to be served by
probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citi-
zens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.
605 F.2d at 150. The significance of this test is questionable. The second factor does
little more than restate the issue: if probationers enjoy the full panoply of constitutional
rights, a condition which infringes those rights is invalid. If a probationer's rights are
limited, the extent of the limitation is for the court to decide, which is frequently the
issue when probation conditions are challenged under the Constitution. See also In re
White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 146, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (1979) ("Where a condi-
tion of probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must
be narrowly drawn; to the extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the com-
pelling state interest in reformation and is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise
of fundamental rights."). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-202(1)(a) (1985) (the
court may prohibit a probationer from holding public office).
76. See Colburn v. State, 510 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (condition
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In People v. Dominguez," the court convicted Mercedes Dominguez
of second degree robbery and placed her on probation.78 The trial
court imposed the condition that she "not... live with any man to
whom you are not married and.., not to become pregnant until after
you become married."7 9 Dominguez, who had never married, was
pregnant with her third child when convicted." During probation she
again became pregnant and the court revoked her probation." On ap-
peal, the California Court of Appeal voided the condition. 2 The court
promulgated the following test to determine a condition's validity: "A
condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in
itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reason-
ably related to future criminality... is invalid."8 "
In voiding the condition, the court noted that it is not a crime for an
unmarried woman to become pregnant. In addition, the court noted
that the future pregnancy was not reasonably related to robbery or to
future criminality.8 4 Other jurisdictions have similarly adopted the
Dominguez reasonable relationship test.8 5
Although the appellant in Dominguez did not challenge the constitu-
tionality of her probation condition, in Rodriguez v. State"6 a similarly
that defendant convicted of burglary and petit theft get Graduate Equivalency Degree
held invalid under the Dominquez test as trial court's belief that degree would aid reha-
bilitation and benefit the defendant were not enough to save the condition.); text accom-
panying infra note 83 for a discussion of the Dominquez test; see also State v. Parker, 55
N.C. App. 643, 286 S.E.2d 366 (1982) (condition that defendant convicted of unlaw-
fully injuring personal property by sawing down a light pole refrain from possessing
firearms or dangerous weapons upheld as conditions designed to aid rehabilitation,
which the condition arguably does, are valid even though they appear unrelated.);
Smith v. State, 513 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibition on consumption
of alcohol during probation for defendant convicted of possession of cocaine reasonably
related and upheld).
77. 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
78. Id. at 624, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
79. Id. at 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 626, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
82. Id. at 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
83. Id. at 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
84. Id.
85. State v. Livingston, 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 197-98, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337
(1976); State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 1977); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
86. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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situated defendant challenged the constitutionality of her probation
conditions of aggravated child abuse.87 The trial court forbade Rodri-
guez to have custody of any children, to become pregnant during the
probation period and to marry without the court's consent.88 Rodri-
guez claimed the conditions violated her fundamental rights of procre-
ation and marriage.89
The Florida District Court of Appeal agreed and invalidated the
pregnancy and marriage restrictions.' The basis for the invalidity,
however, did not rest on the constitutional question but on the court's
belief that the conditions did not meet the Dominguez reasonable rela-
tionship test. Regarding the constitutional challenge, the court noted
that a probationer's constitutional rights are qualified by probationary
status. 91 The court cited cases upholding probation conditions that in-
fringed on constitutionally protected rights such as freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, the privilege against self-
incrimination and rights of free speech and association. The court con-
cluded, "[w]e thus have no constitutional difficulty with the conditions
imposed, if they are otherwise valid conditions of probation.",92
Adopting the Dominguez test, the court held that the marriage and
pregnancy conditions are unrelated to the crime of child abuse, that
marriage and pregnancy are not per se criminal and that the conditions
relate only tangentially to future criminality.93 Although the court up-
held the condition that denied Rodriguez custody of the children, it
held the other two conditions unreasonable because they were
excessive.
94
In Gillian v. Los Angeles Municipal Court,95 a California court of
appeals upheld the validity of a probation condition requiring the de-
fendant to abstain from drinking or shopping in stores with alcoholic
87. Id. at 8. Rodriguez pleaded nolo contendere to the charge of aggravated child
abuse. Id.
88. Id. This last condition is premised on the notion that the court would deny
Rodriguez permission to marry a man with young children.
89. Id.
90. Id at 10.
91. Id at 9.
92. Id "Otherwise valid conditions" are those which satisfy the "reasonableness"
test. Id
93. Id at 10.
94. Id See infra note 153 regarding this holding.
95. 97 Cal. App. 3d 704, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
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beverages as the chief item of sale. In Gillian, a defendant convicted of
drunk driving raised right to privacy and first amendment speech and
association issues.9 6 In upholding the conditions, the court stated that
conditions requiring the surrender of constitutional rights are not per
se unconstitutional.97 The court stated that the Dominguez reasonable-
ness test should be applied when evaluating the validity of a probation
condition. The condition's impact on the defendant's constitutional
rights has no bearing upon the court's decision.98 Because probation is
a privilege, the court reasoned, the probationer should not merit the
same constitutional protection afforded ordinary citizens.99 The court
held that the conditions satisfied the Dominguez test and were therefore
reasonable even though they impinged upon the defendant's constitu-
tional rights. "°
'Scarlet letter' probation conditions, such as the "DANGEROUS
SEX OFFENDER - NO CHILDREN ALLOWED" signs, arguably
impinge on the defendant's first amendment guarantees of free speech
and association,"0 the right to privacy1 "2 and the eighth amendment
96. Id. at 707, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
97. Id. at 708, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 77. But see State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176,
179-80, 212 S.E.2d 566, 569, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 263, 214 S.E.2d 436 (1975), where,
in dicta, the court said "[a] condition which is a violation of the defendant's constitu-
tional right and, therefore, beyond the power of the court to impose is per se
unreasonable."
98. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 708, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
99. Id. at 709.
100. Id. Courts have upheld other travel restrictions against fourteenth amendment
challenges. People v. Ison, 132 Mich. App. 61, 64, 346 N.W.2d 894, 896 (1984). In
Ison, the court convicted the defendant of assault with intent to commit second-degree
criminal sexual conduct and placed him on probation. Ison, as a probation condition,
could not leave the state without the court's consent. He claimed this condition vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment right to travel. In upholding the condition, the court
noted that due process may diminish fourteenth amendment rights. "A criminal con-
viction constitutionally deprives the defendant of much of his liberty; convicts retain
some constitutional rights, but those rights are subject to restrictions imposed by the
nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed." Id. at 896 (empha-
sis added). Therefore, the infringement was constitutional and was valid. Id.
101. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech.... ; or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
102. The United States Supreme Court recognizes "privacy" as a constitutional
right. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Probationers challenge probation
conditions as a violation of their right to privacy. Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980), discussed infra note 145. See also State v. Turner, 142 Ariz. 138,
142, 688 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (In upholding a warrantless search
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protection from cruel and unusual punishment." 3 Courts will uphold
conditions restricting first amendment rights of free speech and associ-
ation so long as the restrictions are reasonably related to the crime and
the defendant's rehabilitation. In Commonwealth v. McBride 1° the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that a defendant convicted of cor-
rupting the morals of a minor could not contact or communicate with
the minor.105 The defendant claimed that the condition restricted his
right to free speech and association. °6 Finding the condition neces-
sary to the defendant's rehabilitation and society's protection, the court
held the condition valid. 1 7 Conditions designed to rehabilitate
criminals and protect society, the court noted, will necessarily infringe
upon a defendant's personal liberties.l08 Conversely, persons who have
not broken the law enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights. Pro-
bationers, who by definition have broken the law, do not. 09
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that courts could
impose probation conditions that infringed upon first amendment
rights if reasonably necessary to prevent future criminality. "0 In Ma-
lone v. United States"'. the court convicted the defendant of exporting
arms to the United Kingdom to aid the Irish Republican Army
(IRA)." 2 The court imposed conditions that forbade the defendant
from participating in or belonging to the American Irish Republican
movement or any Irish organizations. Moreover, the court denied the
probation condition, the court noted that a probationer's expectations of privacy are less
than those of other citizens not so categorized).
103. The eighth amendment reads: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
104. 289 Pa. Super. 396, 433 A.2d 509 (1981).
105. Id. at 399, 433 A.2d at 511.
106. Id. at 398, 433 A.2d at 510.
107. Id. at 399, 433 A.2d at 511.
108. Id. at 398-99, 433 A.2d at 510.
109. Id.
110. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1124 (1975). This is a federal case decided under the Federal Probation Act, state
courts cite Malone for the proposition that probation conditions infringing first amend-
ment rights are valid. See, e.g.,, Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); see also Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971) (probation conditions
may curtail first amendment protections where such curtailment is reasonably related to
treatment of the accused and protection of the public).
111. 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974).
112. I'd at 556.
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defendant the freedom to visit Irish pubs or accepting employment that
directly or indirectly associated him with Irish organizations or move-
ments."13 Noting the broad discretion trial courts wield in setting pro-
bation conditions, the Ninth Circuit found a reasonable nexus between
the conditions imposed and the purposes of probation."' The restric-
tions were reasonably related to preventing Malone's future criminality
given his strong affinity towards the IRA."11
The District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Second District is
thus far the only court to address the validity of a 'scarlet letter' proba-
tion condition. In Goldschmitt v. State 1 6 the trial court required a
convicted drunk driver to affix a bumper sticker to his car reading
"CONVICTED D.U.I. - RESTRICTED LICENSE."' 1 7 In a per cu-
rium decision, the court upheld the validity of the condition against
first and eighth amendment attacks.1 18
Claiming a First amendment violation, Goldschmitt argued that the
signs constituted "forced speech" because they required him to convey
an ideological message through the bumper stickers.1 19 Goldschmitt
based this claim on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Wooley v. Maynard.'2 ° Wooley held that a New Hampshire Jehovah's
Witness could permissibly cover the state's "live Free or Die" motto on
the state's license tags without facing criminal charges. Rejecting this
argument, the Goldschmitt court likened the bumper sticker's ideologi-
cal content to that of a permit to park in a handicapped parking
113. Id. at 555.
114. Id. at 556.
115. Id. at 557.
116. 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (Fla.
1986).
117. Id. at 124.
118. Goldschmitt's eighth amendment arguments and the court's related disposi-
tion are noted at infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
119. 490 So. 2d at 125. The United States Supreme Court has held that first amend-
ment precludes states from forcing a citizen to speak just as it protects the right to
speak. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(school children not required to participate in a flag salute ceremony); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspapers not required to publish
political rebuttals by candidates the newspaper criticizes); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (Jehovah's Witness may obliterate a state's motto on his license plate with-
out criminal sanction). These cases are premised on the ideological nature of the speech
the law required. See Brief for Appellant at 31-32, State v. Bateman, 94 Or. App. 449,
765 P.2d 249 (1987) (No. A44854) for a discussion of "coerced speech."
120. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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space. 12 1 The Florida court stated that "[t]he deterrent, and thus the
rehabilitative, effect of punishment is enhanced if it 'inflicts disgrace
and contumely in a drastic and spectacular manner.' ,122 The court
also noted that 'scarlet letter' punishment conditions do not offend the
Constitution when the court requires the defendant to merely display a
scarlet letter as part of his punishment.123  Citing Rodriguez,124 the
court upheld the condition as reasonably related to the nature of the
offense. 12
5
The eighth amendment guarantees citizens freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment. 126 A threshold question when a court considers
an eighth amendment challenge is whether probation constitutes a sen-
tence or a punishment. In State v. Macy 127 the Supreme Court of
South Dakota held that the reasonableness of probation conditions
should be measured under the cruel and unusual punishment standard
because probation is not a sentence but a sentence alternative. 28
Therefore, the argument that a condition constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is inappropriate. Nonetheless, in states that treat proba-
tion as a sentence, the eighth amendment may, in an appropriate situa-
tion, apply to probation conditions. 129
121. 490 So. 2d at 125.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). See supra notes
86-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rodriguez case.
125. 490 So. 2d at 125, n.3. The court agreed with the lower court's holding that
the bumper sticker served a rehabilitative purpose. Id.
126. See supra note 103 for the constitutional text. It appears no court has ever
invalidated a probation condition under the eighth amendment. See Brief for Appellee
at 35, State v. Bateman, 94 Or. App. 449, 765 P.2d 249 (1987) (No. A44854) [hereinaf-
ter Appellee's Brief].
127. 403 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 1987).
128. Id. at 745.
129. See State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 411, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) (in dicta, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina said it is cruel and unusual punishment to impose
castration as a probation condition).
The United States Supreme Court articulated the factors to consider in determining
whether a punishment inflicted is cruel and unusual in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983). These factors are "the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty,
... the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction .... [and] the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 290-
92. In Solem, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without pa-
role for passing a bad check, his seventh conviction for a non-violent felony. The
Supreme Court held the sanction invalid under the eighth amendment. Id.
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In Goldschmitt '30 a Florida District Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that a probation condition requiring a convicted drunk
driver to place bumper stickers on his car reading "CONVICTED
D.U.I. - RESTRICTED LICENSE" constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.131 The defendant likened the bumper stickers to the pub-
lic punishment of the pillory of colonial times.132 The court rejected
that argument, noting the differences between the degrading physical
rigors of the pillory and a bumper sticker outweigh their similarities.133
In People v. McDowell'"4 a California trial court required the de-
fendant, a thrice-convicted purse snatcher, to wear shoes with taps on
the heels and the soles any time he left his house.'35 The court im-
posed the condition to alert intended victims. The court also wanted to
make it difficult for the defendant to flee after stealing a purse. 36
On appeal, the defendant attempted to classify the taps requirement
as a 'scarlet letter' condition tantamount to requiring him to wear a
sign saying "I am a thief."137 The defendant petitioned for invalidation
of the condition as cruel and unusual punishment. 138 The California
Court of Appeals held the condition valid 139 because not everyone who
wears taps is a thief.'" In addition, the court held that the condition
passed the Dominguez reasonableness test as the trial court had broad
discretion in imposing probation conditions. 4 ' Finally, the condition
fostered rehabilitation because the sound of the taps served as a re-
minder of the probation and the threat of incarceration should the de-
130. 490 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). See supra notes 117-25 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment challenge.
131. Id. at 126. See also People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1976), infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text where the court rejected the
claim that a probation condition imposed on a convicted purse snatcher constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. The condition mandated that the defendant not leave
home without tap shoes. Id. at 843.
132. 490 So 2d at 125.
133. Id.
134. 59 Cal. App. 3d 807, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
135. Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
136. Id. at 813, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
137. Id. at 812.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
140. Id. The court remanded the case to the trial court to clarify the condition but
upheld the condition's validity. Id. at 813-14, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
141. Id.
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fendant violate the probation. 142
In summary, courts do not consider the constitutional aspects of an
imposed condition to determine its validity. Rather, courts employ a
reasonableness test.'43 If the condition is reasonably related to the
crime and deters future criminality, the court will uphold the condition
even if it impinges on a constitutionally protected liberty.'" A consti-
tutional argument, therefore, adds little to a defendant's case and will
not persuade a court to invalidate an otherwise reasonable
condition. 145
142. Id.
143. See Jones v. State, 727 P.2d 6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). The trial court con-
victed Jones for selling one gram of marijuana to an undercover police officer and
placed Jones on probation. Id. at 7. One condition for Jones' probation required him
not to enter a 45 block area in downtown Anchorage that the court characterized as a
high crime district. Id. Although Jones lived and worked within the 45 block area, the
trial court desired that Jones to "find a new environment to live and play in." Id. On
appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals did not address Jones' constitutional argument
(cruel and unusual punishment, free speech and association) because it held the condi-
tion did not "comport with the requirement that it be 'reasonably related to the rehabili-
tation of the offender and the protection of the public and... not be unduly restrictive
of liberty."' Id. Despite acknowledging that the area in question was a high crime
district the court found no "clear nexus between the area and Jones' misconduct." Id.
at 8. Instead, the court determined that drugs could be sold anywhere in Anchorage.
Id. at 8. See also In re White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1979) (similar
condition struck down as applied to convicted prostitute). See supra notes 68-142 and
accompanying text discussing application of the reasonableness requirement.
144. In a Florida case, the Court of Appeals invalidated the condition that the de-
fendants refrain from sexual intercourse with anyone other than their spouses. Wiggins
v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) Defendants were convicted for for-
gery, uttering a forged instrument, and burglary. All three defendants were unmarried
and had five children between them. The defendants challenged the condition as an
unconstitutional infringement on their right to privacy. "Under Florida law, constitu-
tionally protected rights can be abridged by conditions of probation if they are reason-
ably related to the probationer's past or future criminality or to the rehabilitative
purpose of probation." The court invalidated the condition as unrelated either to the
crime or the defendants' future criminality. The trial judge originally imposed the con-
dition because defendants claimed the reason for their criminal conduct amounted to
feeding their children. Id. at 47-48.
145. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text discussing the Rodriguez case
that disregarded constitutional claims. But see In re White 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 158
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1979) (court struck down condition prohibiting defendant from entering
specific areas in the city as an unreasonable infringement on defendant's constitutional
right to travel).
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SECTION V - THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 'SCARLET LETTER'
CONDITIONS
While trial judges around the country continue to create and impose
a variety of 'scarlet letter' conditions, courts have yet to review them.
The remainder of this article discusses the constitutionality of these
conditions based on the case analysis in Section IV.
As previously noted, an Oregon Circuit Court convicted Richard J.
Bateman on two counts of first degree sexual abuse and placed him on
probation. 4 6 Richard Bateman, an alcoholic, had an extensive crimi-
nal record which included convictions for sexual abuse of children.
147
Bateman claimed that he was unable to control his propensity to abuse
young children. In response, the court required Bateman to post signs
reading "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO CHILDREN AL-
LOWED," in three-inch lettering, on the door to his residence and
both doors of any vehicle he operated.148 Bateman appealed asking the
court to invalidate this condition as an unconstitutional infringement
of his first amendment right to free speech (here, forced speech) 49 and
association, 150 his right to privacy15 and his eighth amendment right
146. State v. Bateman, 94 Or. App. 449, 765 P.2d 249 (1987), discussed at supra
notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
147. Appellee's Brief supra note 126, at 4-9.
148. The other conditions imposed include:
(1) that he be incarcerated in the Multnomah County Jail for a period of One (1)
Year, with NO passes, (2) that he participate in and successfully complete a thirty
(30) day residential alcohol treatment program, and upon the completion of said
program, the court will entertain a motion for passes for employment purposes
only, (3) that he maintain fulltime employment, (4) that he abstain from the use of
any alcoholic beverages, and further, any prescription drugs/narcotics without
prior notification from doctor to defendant's probation officer, (5) that he partici-
pate in any sexual offender treatment program as directed by his probation officer
and upon this court's approval, (6) that he submit to polygraph examination, at his
expense, as directed by his probation officer, (7) that he submit to random breath
testing and/or urinalysis testing upon the request of his probation officer, (8) that
he not return within ten (10) blocks of 11300 Northeast Morris Street, [Bateman's
prior address and the site of the crimes], (9) that he have NO contact with minors,
(10) [the sign condition for his residence], (11) that he be banned from parks, play-
grounds, the zoo, school grounds or any place where children primarily congre-
gate, and (12) [the sign condition for his vehicle].
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1.
149. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 31-32. See supra note 119 and accompany-
ing text discussing coerced speech.
150. Appellant's Brief supra note 1, at 32-34.
151. Id. at 32-34.
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to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. 52
The trial judge found that the signs were necessary to protect the
public and to aid in Bateman's rehabilitation.1 53 Pending appeal, the
trial court revoked Bateman's probation because he violated other con-
ditions of probation. 54 The Oregon Court of Appeals subsequently
dismissed the appeal as moot despite requests from the state that the
court review the case and determine the validity of the condition. 55
The published apology is another example of a 'scarlet letter' condi-
tion. 5 6 In Newport, Oregon, a trial court gave defendants convicted
of property offenses the option of prison or paying for an advertisement
152. Id. at 21-26. Bateman also argued the sign conditions excessive in the face of
the other conditions limiting his contact with children. Appellant's Brief supra note I,
at 17-20. This is Bateman's strongest argument. While the signs would arguably pass
the Dominquez test, (see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text), Bateman might
rely on the Rodriguez case, supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. In Rodriguez, the
Florida court reasoned that two conditions Ms. Rodriguez followed were excessive in
light of a third condition. Analogously, Bateman might argue that the signs were exces-
sive given that he could not have contact with minors.
153. The judge said:
"A couple of things that I have to consider in sentencing any individual on any
charge is the possibility or likelihood [sic] of rehabilitating the defendant, and also
protecting the community."
Appellant's Brief supra note I, at 9.
The judge's exasperation with Bateman is evident. Responding to Bateman's argu-
ment that the sign condition precluded him from finding a place to live, the judge
stated:
That may well be what happens, but the community has a right to know what his
behavior is. It would probably be much better if we could dye all sex offenders
green so we could tell our children to watch our [sic] for green people. We can't do
that. Some people think that perhaps he should walk around with a sandwich
board that says dangerous sex offender. It's time that something be done about
people who are damaging our children, and Mr[.] Bateman, you are a serious sex
offender that has caused much damage. I'm going to let that order stand to protect
the community. That is a term of your probation, that's your choice, but that is a
term of your probation.
Appellant's Brief supra note 1, at 13.
154. Currently, the state appealed the revocation and hopes to convince the court to
address the validity of the signs. Telephone conversation with Diane Alessi, Deputy
Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, Salem, Oregon, December 16, 1988. Ac-
cording to Ms. Alessi, Bateman complied with the sign provision and posted the sign on
his front door. During the Christmas holidays, however, he hung Christmas cards on
his front door and minimized the sign's appearance. Id.
155. Id.
156. Alternative Sentencing, supra note 66. See also Drunk Driver Penalty, NEws-
DAY, March 29, 1989, at 14 (1) Suffolk ed. (similar ad in Florida's Indian River
County).
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in the local newspaper to publicly apologize for their crimes. The de-
fendants opted for the advertisements which contained their pictures,
their criminal record and a signed apology.157 The following is an
example:
CRIMINAL'S APOLOGY - Thomas E. Kirby was convicted of
Burglary First Degree for burglarizing a residence in South Beach,
Oregon on October 25, 1985. He has previously been convicted of
burglary in Portland. He was placed on probation ... and or-
dered to... place this ad in the Newport News-Times apologizing
for his conduct. At the time of his arrest, he was in a residence on
Sam Creek Road in the Toledo/Newport area. Prior to this he
resided in Waldport.
APOLOGY - I, Tom Kirby, wish to apologize to the people of
the City of Newport for all of the problems I have caused. I know
now what I did was selfish and wrong. I also realize that I have
caused a lot of hardships on people that were my friends and also
my own family. I want to thank the courts for a second chance to
prove that I can be an honest upstanding person. My apologies
again for causing any inconvenience to anyone.
158
Beneath the apology was this "Crime Stoppers Tip:"
As the jails and penitentiaries fill up and criminals remain in the
community, be aware of which of your neighbors pose a threat to
you and your family. Don't hesitate to call a person's probation
officer or the police if you observe any suspicious activity on their
part. Be aware of who has been convicted of crimes and who may
be committing crimes in your neighborhood.15 9
An Urbana, Illinois circuit court judge imposed a similar condition
on convicted drunk drivers.16
°
157. Alternative Sentencing, supra note 66.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Picture Thisfor an Apology, 10 NAT'L. L.J., June 6, 1988 at 51. The text of the
apology provides:
DRUNK DRIVER'S APOLOGY - [defendant's name] admitted to driving while
under the influence of alcohol in open court on [date] at [time] in City (Town) of-
- in Champaign County and at that time was under the influence of alcohol.
APOLOGY - I, [defendant's name], have pleaded guilty to the offense of DUI
and apologize to the citizens of Champaign County for endangering them. NO-
TICE - This defendant was placed on Court supervision. Part of the sentence
required the defendant to apologize in this ad to the citizens of Champaign County.
At this time, this defendant still retains the ability to drive. However, that privi-
lege will be lost if the defendant violates any law.
Id. According to the National Law Journal article, one defendant planned to appeal
this condition. Id.
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Reviewing courts should uphold 'scarlet letter' conditions such as
the Bateman signs, the Goldschmitt bumper stickers and the published
apologies. While such conditions arguably conflict with constitution-
ally guaranteed rights and liberties, a probationer's status is condi-
tional. Probationers are convicted criminals at liberty because of the
legislature's and the court's largess. 161 Under the emerging view, pro-
bation may legitimately include punitive aspects. 162
'Scarlet letter' conditions satisfy the Dominguez reasonableness test
if they relate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, do
not relate to conduct which is not criminal and relate to future crimi-
nality. In Bateman the signs clearly relate to the defendant's crime of
sexually abusing young children. The signs communicate a narrowly
focused message and do not relate to conduct which is not itself crimi-
nal because they do not prohibit the defendant from engaging in non-
criminal activity. Finally, the signs deter Bateman's future criminality
because they are a constant reminder of his crime and probationary
status. Similarly, the Goldschmitt bumper stickers and published apol-
ogies also represent a reasonable condition of probation.
CONCLUSION
Courts impose probation conditions to aid in the defendant's rehabil-
itation and to protect the public from future criminal conduct. 'Scarlet
letter' conditions, such as those required of Bateman and Goldschmitt,
aid in the defendant's rehabilitation. They serve as a constant re-
minder that a court may revoke a defendant's liberties if the defendant
violates the law or the conditions of probation. Additionally, the signs
inform the public of the probationer's status affording them the oppor-
tunity to assist in the defendant's rehabilitation. In Bateman, for ex-
ample, parents would probably distance their children from Bateman's
home or car, thus removing any temptation Bateman might have to
violate them again. Public ostracism resulting from the signs can aid in
rehabilitation as defendants learn that society will not tolerate unac-
ceptable criminal behavior. Public ostracism also reinforces the pun-
ishment element.
Although harsh, 'scarlet letter' conditions broaden the base of poten-
tial probationers. They necessarily involve the community at large in
161. See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text noting that probation is a
privilege.
162. See supra notes 23-33, 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
punitive aspects.
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the rehabilitation process. Just as the addition of stringent monitoring
conditions permitted courts to safely and effectively place a greater
number of more serious offenders on probation,' 63 the addition of
'scarlet letter' conditions will increase the number of potential proba-
tioners. By informing the public of who is on probation and for what
crime, the public may assist in monitoring a probationer's behavior by
contacting authorities when necessary. Moreover, the signs afford a
probationer the benefits of conditional liberty while affording the pub-
lic some of the benefits of incarceration which may reduce a defend-
ant's criminal behavior.
'Scarlet letter' conditions are consistent with probation's evolving,
broadening function as recognized in the new Federal Sentencing Re-
form Act and several state statutes. 164 The conditions reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just
punishment. Probation is not meant to be painless. Although the signs
are harsh and possess a punitive element, this does not render them
unconstitutional.
The signs also afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. The
increased potential for apprehension, should the probationer commit a
crime, should deter him from future criminal conduct. The conditions
also shield the public from this criminal conduct because the public
will avoid assisting the defendant. Instead, the public will act as pri-
vate enforcers of the law by reporting a defendant's wrongful behavior.
Probation is becoming, and should be, the favored disposition in
criminal cases. Incarceration's rehabilitative shortcomings are appar-
ent. 1 65  As criminal prosecutions increase, prison resources are
stretched beyond capacity.1 66 Consequently, probation offers a greater
hope for rehabilitation, protecting the public and distributing criminal
justice resources. Probation offers relief only if it exacts from the de-
fendant what traditional criminal punishment exacts.
Jeffrey C. Filcik*
163. See supra notes 30 & 33, 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of strin-
gent monitoring conditions as applied to more serious offenders.
164. See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text for this discussion.
165. See supra note 18 and accompanying text noting these shortcomings.
166. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text discussing prison overcrowding.
* J.D. 1989, Washington University.
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